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Abstract
Background: Activity-based funding (ABF) of hospitals is a policy intervention intended to re-shape incentives across health
systems through the use of diagnosis-related groups. Many countries are adopting or actively promoting ABF. We assessed
the effect of ABF on key measures potentially affecting patients and health care systems: mortality (acute and post-acute
care); readmission rates; discharge rate to post-acute care following hospitalization; severity of illness; volume of care.
Methods: We undertook a systematic review and meta-analysis of the worldwide evidence produced since 1980. We
included all studies reporting original quantitative data comparing the impact of ABF versus alternative funding systems in
acute care settings, regardless of language. We searched 9 electronic databases (OVID MEDLINE, EMBASE, OVID Healthstar,
CINAHL, Cochrane CENTRAL, Health Technology Assessment, NHS Economic Evaluation Database, Cochrane Database of
Systematic Reviews, and Business Source), hand-searched reference lists, and consulted with experts. Paired reviewers
independently screened for eligibility, abstracted data, and assessed study credibility according to a pre-defined scoring
system, resolving conflicts by discussion or adjudication.
Results: Of 16,565 unique citations, 50 US studies and 15 studies from 9 other countries proved eligible (i.e. Australia,
Austria, England, Germany, Israel, Italy, Scotland, Sweden, Switzerland). We found consistent and robust differences
between ABF and no-ABF in discharge to post-acute care, showing a 24% increase with ABF (pooled relative risk =1.24, 95%
CI 1.18–1.31). Results also suggested a possible increase in readmission with ABF, and an apparent increase in severity of
illness, perhaps reflecting differences in diagnostic coding. Although we found no consistent, systematic differences in
mortality rates and volume of care, results varied widely across studies, some suggesting appreciable benefits from ABF, and
others suggesting deleterious consequences.
Conclusions: Transitioning to ABF is associated with important policy- and clinically-relevant changes. Evidence suggests
substantial increases in admissions to post-acute care following hospitalization, with implications for system capacity and
equitable access to care. High variability in results of other outcomes leaves the impact in particular settings uncertain, and
may not allow a jurisdiction to predict if ABF would be harmless. Decision-makers considering ABF should plan for likely
increases in post-acute care admissions, and be aware of the large uncertainty around impacts on other critical outcomes.
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Introduction
As health care systems evolve, policymakers strive to design
approaches to hospital funding that simultaneously boost efficien-
cy, increase budget transparency to promote accountability [1],
and expand volume of activity [2], all while maintaining quality of
care [3], and assuring equitable access to hospital services [4].
Activity-based funding (ABF) is an alternative to other hospital
funding mechanisms, such as negotiated funding through global
budgets or block grants, per diem payments, or retrospective cost-
based reimbursement. Increasingly popular, ABF is a significant
policy intervention intended to re-shape incentives across health
care systems [5].
Under ABF, hospitals receive a fixed amount for each episode of
care delivered to each patient, regardless of length of stay or actual
resources used (sometimes with refinements for outliers). The
funding schedule is prospectively determined based on clinically
meaningful diagnosis-based ‘‘bundles’’ of services within which
patients can be expected to consume similar amounts of resources.
The funding allocation for these bundles is intended to account for
the anticipated complexity, type, volume, and intensity of care
ordinarily provided to patients admitted with particular diagnoses.
A variety of cost accounting systems underpin the processes used
to set a prospective price for each bundle of services [6]. The price
of each bundle coupled with the volume of bundles provided
determines all or part of the facility’s budget.
ABF was first developed in the United States (US) in response to
rising health care costs coupled with economic stagnation, which
together stimulated a radical restructuring of Medicare funding
[7]. Beginning in 1983, the US implemented ABF based on
Diagnosis-Related Groups (DRGs) to fund acute hospital care for
Medicare beneficiaries [8]. Since then, other countries have
adopted variants of this episode- or service-related bundling
approach as the basis for their hospital funding.
Internationally, ABF is known by a variety of terms — often
confused in translation leading to a lack of clarity in the literature
— including Prospective Payment System (PPS in the US);
Payment-by-Results (PbR in the English National Health Service);
Fallpauschalen system/vergu ¨tung (in Germany); Innsatsstyrt
finansiering (ISF in Norway); Forfaits par cas/leistungsbezogene
Fallpauschale (in Switzerland); case-mix funding; volume-based
funding; and service-based funding [9]. In this paper, we use the
term ABF. All ABF funding systems are based on DRG-like
grouping algorithms (such as AR-DRGs ‘‘Australian-refined’’; case
mix groups (CMG+) in Canada; health-resource groups (HRGs in
England); Groupe Homoge `ne des Malades (GHM) in France; G-
DRGS in Germany; Diagnose Behandeling Combinatie (DBC in
the Netherlands); Nord-DRGs in the Nordic countries; SwissDRG
in Switzerland) [9–11]. ABF implementation differs in each
jurisdiction where it is adopted, with many choices inherent in
the precise design and accompanying rules.
Possible benefits of ABF may include reduced hospital costs
[12,13], greater funding and spending transparency [4,9],
improved efficiency [3,14]; reduced length of stay [15]; and
shorter wait times [6]. Enthusiasts also claim that a culture change
— by which patients are seen not as cost drivers but as ‘‘revenue
generators’’ [3,5] — is a natural result of ABF. Possible
detrimental consequences of ABF include increased mortality
[16], increased readmission to hospital [17], rapid discharge of sick
patients into ill-prepared community settings [18], an incentive to
‘‘upcode’’ diagnoses and thus ‘‘game’’ the system [19,20], focus on
‘‘profitable’’ over ‘‘unprofitable’’ patients and procedures com-
promising equitable access to care [21,22], and increased
administrative and/or overall costs to the health care system
[23,24].
Because it is natural for advocates and opponents to selectively
cite evidence supporting their positions, to better inform decision-
makers we undertook a systematic review of the worldwide
evidence bearing on how ABF affects quality of care, access to
care, equity, hospital and total health care system costs, length of
stay, and efficiency. For this report, we focus on how ABF affects
six key measures, each with the potential to affect patients and
health care system capacity: acute care mortality (AC mortality);
and post-acute care mortality (PAC mortality); readmission rates;
discharge destination measured by discharge to post-acute care
(PAC) following hospitalization; severity of illness; and volume of
care. We also explored whether the impact of ABF on these six key
measures varied according to either contextual factors of the
health care systems, or the research methods used to assess the
impact of ABF, by examining six pre-specified sub-groups: study
location; study design; time elapsed after ABF implementation;
adjustment for confounders; credibility of the methods; time of
outcome assessment.
Methods
Our protocol (available upon request) provides a full description
of our methods; a summary follows.
Eligibility Criteria
We included all studies providing original analyses of quanti-
tative data that compared the impact of ABF versus alternative
funding systems implemented in acute care settings (hospitals and
non-hospital medical or surgical facilities) published in any
language. We included before-after studies in single jurisdictions
(before ABF vs. after ABF implementation), parallel group studies
in multiple jurisdictions (jurisdictions without ABF vs. jurisdiction
with ABF), or a combination of both designs (e.g. difference-in-
difference analyses, time-series). We excluded editorials, letters,
news, and notes as defined by the databases. For this report, we
included only studies reporting data on at least one of our primary
outcomes: AC mortality, PAC mortality, readmission rates, and
discharge destination. For eligible studies that reported at least one
of these primary outcomes, we also abstracted data on severity of
illness and volume of care.
We excluded studies that did not include a comparator group in
which ABF was not implemented. We further excluded studies
that focused only on activity-based cost accounting systems; on
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for-performance (a financial incentive for attaining targeted service
goals [25]); and on systems based on a flat rate per diem or for
another period of time, such as the Japanese Diagnosis Procedure
Combination system, Chinese Hainan system, and Medicare
Resource Utilization Groups.
Outcomes
Acute Care Mortality (AC Mortality) was defined as death rate
per population per common time period in the ABF and no ABF
comparator, starting at admission to acute care or at surgery. We
excluded mortality measured only in-hospital or only from
discharge since the potential influence of ABF may have been
confounded by differences in length of stay in ABF and no ABF
periods.
Post-Acute Care Mortality (PAC Mortality) was defined
similarly to acute care mortality, except that mortality was
measured starting from admission to PAC following a stay in
acute care.
Hospital Readmission was defined as readmission rates per
population per common time period (preferentially at 30 days) in
the ABF and no ABF comparator.
Discharge Destination was defined as the proportion of patients
discharged alive from acute care to PAC, rather than to home.
PAC included: intermediate care facilities, nursing homes, PAC
facilities designated under the US Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid (i.e. skilled nursing facilities; in-patient rehabilitation
facilities; long-term care hospitals; home health agencies), and
similar facilities in other countries. If data were reported for
different PAC destinations, we aggregated them for our analysis.
Changes in the distributions of reported severity of illness
included differences in measures such as case mix, diagnostic
codes, DRG points, or number of patients with comorbidities.
Changes in volume of care included differences in measures such
as the number of patients treated or admitted or number of
procedures or tests performed.
Search Strategy
Our search was limited to articles published from 1980 through
2012. We worked with a health information specialist to develop
search terms; identified subject headings, terms, and keywords
from key articles; and designed search strategies for ABF and
related terms, such as DRGs and PPS, in combination with terms
related to hospital and facility costs, and patient care. Studies were
identified through bibliographic database searches of OVID
MEDLINE, EMBASE, OVID Healthstar, CINAHL, Cochrane
Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL), Health
Technology Assessment, NHS Economic Evaluation Database,
Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, and Business Source
Complete. In each database, we undertook an iterative process to
customize and refine search strategies. Appendix 1 (see File S1)
presents a sample of our electronic search strategies.
In addition to electronic databases, we hand-searched reference
lists of eligible studies and those of previously published reviews,
books, websites, policy papers, personal files, and consulted with
experts.
Study Selection
Using web-based systematic review software (DistillerSR) paired
reviewers independently conducted screening; first title and
abstracts, and then full texts of articles in which titles and abstracts
appeared potentially eligible. We pre-defined screening rules, and
reviewers completed calibration exercises prior to reviewing full
texts.
Data Abstraction
Adhering to pre-defined abstraction rules, paired reviewers
independently abstracted the following data from each article
using standardized data abstraction forms custom built in
DistillerSR and adapted to each study design: country and year
of ABF implementation, data source, sampling methods, study
population (type and number of patients and institutions),
outcomes assessed, and results.
When studies reported data for several time periods before and
after ABF implementation, we abstracted data from three time
periods: 1) no ABF, defined as the first data point prior to ABF
implementation within three years of implementation; 2) early
ABF, defined as the first data point after ABF implementation
irrespective of the proportion of ABF; 3) late ABF, defined as the
data point farthest from ABF implementation up to 5 years
following implementation, irrespective of the proportion of
funding under ABF.
Whenever possible, we abstracted data to enable a meta-
analysis for our primary outcomes. When data were not poolable,
two abstractors independently abstracted narrative summaries
including outcome direction, magnitude, and statistical signifi-
cance.
Credibility Assessment
Pairs of reviewers independently assessed the credibility of
individual studies according to a pre-defined scoring system
documenting three criteria: 1) quality of data sources; 2) number of
eligible outcomes simultaneously examined in the study; and 3)
comprehensiveness and appropriateness of the adjustment for
potential confounders. The maximum credibility score was 6 and
the minimum 0, and higher credibility was a priori categorized as
a score of 4 or more.
Eligibility, data abstraction, and credibility assessment conflicts
between the two independent reviewers in each pair were resolved
by discussion or if necessary with adjudication by a senior team
member.
Heterogeneity and Hypothesized Sub-Group Effects
We hypothesized a priori that variability in results across studies
might be due to the following: study location (US vs. international);
study design (before-after vs. parallel-controlled study); time after
ABF implementation (2 years or less = early ABF vs. more than 2
years = late ABF); adjustment for confounders (adjusted vs.
unadjusted); credibility (higher vs. lower); and time of assessment
of mortality or readmission (within 30 days vs. more than 30 days).
The comparison US vs. International may also be considered as
an indirect comparison of: i) older studies (US) vs. more recent
studies (International); ii) mainly cost-based reimbursement before
ABF (US) vs. non-cost-based funding before ABF (International).
Data analysis
We pre-specified a set of conditions necessary to pool reported
data in a meta-analysis. Data had to be either detailed unadjusted
frequencies in the ABF and no ABF group, or effect estimates with:
1) a measure of variation (e.g. standard deviation, variance); or 2)
sufficient statistical information (e.g. standard error, confidence
intervals, exact p-values) along with exact number of patients at
risk (Appendix 2, see File S1).
For studies that reported poolable data, we conducted a quanti-
tative meta-analysis of 4 dichotomous outcomes – AC mortality,
PAC mortality, hospital readmission, discharge to PAC – using
random effects models. When both adjusted and unadjusted data
were reported, we used adjusted data. The adjusted estimates
Activity-Based Funding of Hospitals Systematic Review
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(RR) for discharge destination and readmission, and odds ratios
(OR) for mortality data. When only hazard ratios (HR) or
incidence rate ratios were reported we converted them to RR.
We assessed heterogeneity in results using the Cochrane’s Q test
[26] and calculated the I
2 [27]. We conducted all pre-specified
sub-group analyses performing tests for interaction, with a p value
,0.05 considered as statistically significant. When seven or more
studies were available we addressed publication bias graphically
using funnel plots.
For non-poolable data we recorded direction of outcome with
ABF vs. no ABF (increase, decrease, mixed, no difference);
magnitude (relative difference $5%, $1% to ,5%, ,1%,
indeterminate or mixed); and statistical significance (p..05, p#
.05–.02, p#.01–.002, p#.001, p-value not reported), and consid-
ered possible differences in effect of study location (US vs.
international) and study credibility (higher vs. lower).
Results
Figure 1 presents the flow of acquisition of eligible studies. Of
16,565 unique citations, 227 reported data from 64 countries
addressing the impact of ABF on quality or access to care, equity,
cost, or efficiency. Of these, 65 studies [16–18,28–89] reporting
data from 10 countries — 50 US studies and 15 studies from other
countries (i.e. Australia, Austria, England, Germany, Israel, Italy,
Scotland, Sweden, Switzerland)— provided data on at least one of
our primary outcomes. The weighted kappa coefficient for overall
agreement across reviewer pairs screening full texts ranged from
0.72 to 0.86.
Table 1 presents the location, design, and sampling of the
eligible studies, of which 36 provided data that contributed to the
pooled analysis for at least one variable. The median number of
outcomes reported per study was 3.0 (inter-quartile range 2.0 to 3.0).
Credibility of study results
Overall credibility of included studies was generally low, but
varied across outcomes (Appendix 3, see File S1). The number of
higher credibility studies ranged between 27% to 63% across
studies with poolable outcomes and from 0% to 58% across studies
with non-poolable outcomes.
The majority of studies did not provide satisfactory documen-
tation of the quality of their data sources. From 64% to 80%
Figure 1. Prisma flow diagram.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0109975.g001
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14% to 20% performed a comprehensive adjustment.
Main Findings
Table 2 summarizes the key results for pooled and non-pooled
analyses across outcomes. Consistent and credible differences
between ABF and no ABF were found only in discharge to PAC,
which was greater with ABF (RR 1.24, 95% CI 1.18 to 1.31).
Results also suggested an apparent increase in severity of illness
with ABF, and possibly in readmission (with early ABF in the US
and late ABF in other countries). In general, results were consistent
between US studies and international studies, as well as between
early and late implementation of ABF. Additional details of results
by outcome follow.
AC Mortality
AC Mortality pooled results. Eight studies (six US;
Switzerland; Germany) reporting poolable data demonstrated no
difference in AC mortality between ABF and no ABF (OR=1.03,
95% CI 0.93 to 1.15, p=0.54, I
2=57%) (Figure 2). Although the
I
2 was relatively large, the results of the large studies were very
consistent in showing no difference in AC mortality. None of our
pre-specified sub-group analyses explained heterogeneity in
findings (Appendix 4, see File S1). The funnel plot did not suggest
publication bias (Appendix 5, see File S1). Appendix 6 (see File S1)
presents details of study descriptions.
AC Mortality non-pooled results (Early ABF and Late
ABF). Two studies (US; Scotland/England) reported that, early
after ABF was implemented, mortality increased with small or
indeterminate magnitude and without reporting p-values. One
Table 1. Study Characteristics (Pooled and Non-Pooled).
Variable Frequency N=65
Pooled studies (n=36) Non-Pooled studies (n=29) Total (N=65)
Study Demographics
Type of Publication:
Full-text journal article 35 29 64
Government report 10 1
Non-government report 00 0
Geographic Location of Study:
USA 28 22 50
Australia 21 3
Austria 01 1
England 01 1
Germany 11 2
Israel 01 1
Italy 31 4
Scotland 01 1
Sweden 10 1
Switzerland 11 2
Methods
Study Design
Before vs. After ABF (single jurisdiction) 34 25 59
Parallel groups (multiple jurisdictions) 21 3
Parallel groups & before/after 03 3
Sampling Method
Random 65 1 1
Convenience 20 16 36
All eligible institutions in a jurisdiction 10 9 19
Number of Patients Evaluated
Less than 1,000 14 1 15
1,000 to 10,000 93 1 2
Greater than 10,000 77 1 4
Number of Institutions evaluated
Less than 5 13 3 16
5t o5 0 83 1 1
Greater than 50 61 5 2 1
Note: frequencies may not add to 65 as not all categories are mutually exclusive.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0109975.t001
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after ABF was implemented. A second study (US) reported that
mortality increased in some sub-groups and decreased in others
without reporting p-values. Appendices 7, 8, 9 (see File S1) present
study descriptions, main findings, and analyses.
AC Mortality Summary. The pooled analysis showed no
impact of ABF on mortality; non-pooled results show a possible
increase in mortality in the early stages of ABF implementation,
and mixed results later.
PAC Mortality
PAC Mortality results (pooled and non-pooled). Three
US studies reported poolable data with very wide confidence
intervals including both substantial decrease and appreciable
increase in PAC mortality with ABF (RR=0.80, 95% CI 0.52
to1.24, p=0.32, I
2=34%). The single additional US study
reporting non-poolable data, suggested no difference in mortality
with ABF. Appendices 10, 11, 12, 13 (see File S1) present the forest
plot, study descriptions, main findings, and analyses.
Hospital Readmission
Readmission Pooled results. Twelve studies (eight US; two
Australia; two Italy) reporting poolable data suggested no overall
difference in readmissions (RR=1.04, 95% CI 0.93 to 1.16,
p=0.48, I
2=73%) (Figure 3). None of our pre-specified sub-group
analyses explained the high variability in findings across studies,
with some studies showing a significant increase [17,32] and others
a significant decrease [78,83] in readmission rates with ABF
Table 2. Summary of Findings of the Impact of ABF (Pooled and Non-Pooled).
Pooled Analysis* Non-Pooled Analysis*
AC Mortality No difference (modest variability) Early ABF: Increase (2 studies consistent)
Late ABF: No difference (2 studies mixed)
PAC Mortality No difference (modest variability) No difference (1 study)
Readmission No difference (high variability) Early ABF: Increase (modest variability)
Late ABF: US studies: No difference (high variability)
International: Increase (2 studies mixed)
Discharge to PAC Overall increase (modest variability) Possible subgroup
effect: increase in US, no increase in international
Increase (modest variability)
Severity of illness N/A Increase (high variability)
Volume of Care N/A No difference (high variability)
*Note: In general, results were consistent between US studies and international studies, as well as between early and late implementation of ABF. We have specified
occurrences where results credibly differed.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0109975.t002
Figure 2. Acute Care Mortality Forest Plot.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0109975.g002
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bias (Appendix 15, see File S1). Appendix 16 (see File S1) presents
study descriptions.
Even though it presented data amenable to statistical analysis,
we excluded one US study [49] with a RR of readmission greater
than 20 from our primary analysis. We attributed the results,
which we found not credible, to ‘‘unbundling’’ cataract surgeries.
Whereas prior to ABF, patients requiring bilateral cataract surgery
would have both cataracts done in a single admission, under ABF
they were discharged after the first cataract procedure and
readmitted for the second eye. A sensitivity analysis in which we
included this study showed a marked increase in heterogeneity,
and thus a considerably widened confidence interval in our
random effects model (RR=1.40, 95% CI 0.66 to 2.94, p=0.38,
I
2 =100%).
Readmission Non-poolable results (Early ABF and Late
ABF). Six studies (three US; Italy; Israel; England/Scotland)
reported that early after ABF, readmissions increased, of which
three reported a large increase. One US study reported a large
decrease in readmissions. None of these studies reported p-values.
Three studies (one US; Australia; Austria) reported no difference.
Three studies (one US; Switzerland; Germany) reported that
late after ABF, readmissions increased, two of which reported a
large increase. None of these studies reported p-values. Four
studies (three US; England/Scotland) reported a decrease in
readmissions of which two reported a large and, at least for some
sub-groups, statistically significant difference. Three studies (all
US) reported no difference. Appendices 17, 18, 19 (see file S1)
present study descriptions, main findings, and analyses.
Readmission Summary. The pooled analysis showed no
difference in readmissions after ABF, but some studies showed a
significant increase and others a significant decrease. In the non-
pooled analysis, most studies showed an increase in readmissions
early in ABF. In the later ABF period, results were mixed.
Discharge Destination
Discharge to PAC Pooled results. Pooled data from
twenty-two studies (19 US; Sweden; Germany; Italy) showed an
increase in discharge to PAC with ABF (pooled RR=1.24, 95%
CI 1.18 to 1.31, I
2=100%) (Figure 4). In a sub-group analysis,
there was a 28% relative increase in discharge to PAC in the 19
US studies (RR=1.28, 95% CI 1.22 to 1.36, I
2=100%), but no
difference in the 3 international studies (RR=1.01, 95% CI 0.94
to1.09, I
2=86%) (test for interaction p=0.04) (Appendix 20, see
File S1). Only one US study of lowest credibility showed a
decrease in discharges to PAC with ABF [76]. Despite the very
high I
2, the U.S. studies were consistent in showing an increase in
discharge to PAC. None of our other pre-specified sub-groups
explained the residual heterogeneity. The funnel plot did not
suggest publication bias (Appendix 21, see File S1). Appendix 22
(see File S1) presents study descriptions.
Discharge to PAC Non-Pooled Results (Early ABF and
Late ABF). Seven studies (all US) reported that early after ABF
implementation there was a large increase in discharge to PAC;
one reported p,0.01, the others did not report p-values. One US
study reported a large decrease in discharge to PAC without
reporting an associated p-value. One US study reported mixed
results.
Figure 3. Readmission Forest Plot.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0109975.g003
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PAC increased; in four the increases were large. None of these
studies reported p-values. One US study reported a large decrease
in admissions to PAC (p,0.05). One US study reported an
increase to some types of PAC and a decrease to others, and one
an increase in two sub-groups and a decrease in one other. Study
descriptions, main findings, and analyses are found in Appendices
23, 24, 25 (see File S1).
Discharge to PAC Summary. The pooled analysis showed a
24% increased risk of discharge to some form of PAC, a result
consistent with the non-pooled data. The pooled analysis also
showed a possible sub-group effect with a 28% increased risk of
discharge to PAC in the 19 US studies, but the effect was not
observed in the three international studies.
Severity of Illness
Severity of Illness Non-pooled results (Early ABF and Late
ABF). Nine studies (six US; two Italy; Australia) reported that
early after ABF implementation there was an increase in severity
of illness of which seven reported a large effect (five US; Italy;
Australia); of these, five reported some significant p-values. In two
studies, the magnitude of the increase was not reported; of these,
one reported a p-value of ,0.01. Three studies (two US;
Germany) reported that early after ABF there was a decrease in
Figure 4. Discharge Destination Forest Plot.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0109975.g004
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difference and three studies (two US; Italy) reported mixed results.
Nine studies (eight US; Germany) reported that late after ABF
there was an increase in severity of illness, large in five studies,
moderate in two, and mixed in two; none reported p-values. Three
studies (two US; Germany) reported a large decrease in severity of
illness, two without reporting p-values and one reporting p,0.01.
One study (US) reported no difference and four reported mixed
results (three US; Switzerland). Study descriptions, main findings,
and analyses tables are found in Appendices 26, 27, 28 (see File
S1).
Severity of Illness Summary. Reported severity of illness
increased both early and late after ABF in the majority of studies,
though results varied across studies. There was no difference
between US and international.
Volume of Care
Volume of Care Non-pooled results (Early ABF and Late
ABF). Six studies (two US; Italy; Australia; Sweden; England/
Scotland) reported that early after ABF implementation volume of
care increased, of which five reported a large increase, but without
reporting p-values. One study reported a significant increase in
volume (p,0.01) but without reporting the magnitude. Eight
studies (five US; two Italy; Switzerland) reported a decrease in
volume of care of which six reported a large and one a moderate
decrease; seven of these studies did not report p-values and one a
large decrease with a p-value of ,0.001. Three studies (two US;
Austria) reported no difference and two (US; Australia) mixed
results.
Six studies (five US; England/Scotland) reported that late after
ABF volume of care increased, large in four studies and moderate
in one (but without reporting p-values) and significant in one (p,
0.01, but without reporting magnitude). Four studies (three US;
Australia) reported a decrease in volume of care, of which three
reported a large decrease but no p-values, and one reported p,
0.05. One US study reported no difference and one mixed results.
Study descriptions, main findings, and analyses tables are found in
Appendices 29, 30, 31 (see File S1).
Volume of Care Summary. Results regarding the impact of
ABF on volume of care showed high variability, with approxi-
mately the same number of studies showing an increase as
decrease both early and late after ABF was implemented. There
was no difference between US and international studies.
Discussion
Principal Findings
Our study is the first systematic review of the international
literature addressing the impact of activity-based funding of
hospitals. The evidence suggests no consistent impact of ABF on
mortality in either acute or post-acute care. There was no impact
on rates of readmission to hospital in the pooled analysis, but a
suggestion of an increase in readmission early after ABF from the
studies without poolable data. We found an apparent though
highly variable increase in reported severity of illness, and no
difference in volume of care, though this, too, was highly variable.
Our most notable finding was a large increase in admissions to
PAC after a hospital stay, though this appeared restricted to US
and not international settings.
Strengths and Limitations
Strengths of this review included: explicit eligibility criteria; a
comprehensive search that yielded a large number of eligible
studies; assessment of the credibility of each eligible study; a
rigorous approach to data abstraction and summarization of
studies, both those that provided data amenable to statistical
analysis and those that did not; tests of a priori hypotheses of
possible explanations for heterogeneity; and duplicate assessment
of eligibility, credibility, and data abstraction with third party
adjudication when necessary.
The main limitation of our review lies in the deficiencies of the
primary studies. The majority of eligible studies were before-after
studies; thus, when differences are evident, they may be the result
of temporal trends independent of ABF. This is of particular
concern because hospital funding reform is rarely implemented as
a solitary intervention. For instance, adoption of ABF in the
English NHS was accompanied by a wave of competitive internal
market reforms [90–92]. ABF introduction in the United States
was followed by a restructuring of peer review organizations to
externally audit physicians and hospitals for quality indicators
[93]. Other secular trends that may confound attribution of
outcome differences to ABF include changes in technology and
related shifts from inpatient to outpatient care, and changes in
other funding policies (for instance, funding for post-acute care).
Low credibility of many studies also limits strong inferences
from the evidence. Credibility problems included lack of
documentation of quality control and error rates in the admin-
istrative databases that provided data for the analyses; lack of
statistical adjustment and, when present, lack of comprehensive
and appropriate adjustment. However, we assessed whether the
higher quality studies yielded different results than the lower
quality studies. This was not the case, suggesting that inferences
can be drawn from the whole body of evidence. In addition, many
studies did not provide information necessary for inclusion in the
pooled statistical analysis, nor did they report on the magnitude of
effects, their statistical significance, or both. Inconsistency in study
results, and the failure of our a priori hypotheses to explain the
inconsistency, also decreases the strength of inferences from the
results. There may be concomitantly implemented policies (e.g.
quality improvement incentives) that may make it more likely that
jurisdictions will see the potential benefits and not the potential
harms of ABF; if this is so, our review provides no insight into what
these strategies may be.
Finally, another limitation is the danger that upcoding in ABF
settings led to differences in the recorded classification of severity
after ABF was implemented [19]. Generally, in observational
studies such as these, adjustment for key variables is crucial for
making causal inferences. In this case, to the extent that upcoding
exists, all adjusted analyses will be biased in favor of ABF. This
concern is somewhat ameliorated by the similarity of effects in the
adjusted and unadjusted analyses.
Relation to prior work
Prior reviews of ABF have shown variable results [2,4,24,94–
98]. This is not surprising since none was systematic or
comprehensive, and thus may be susceptible to study selection
bias.
Prior studies have consistently established that the transition to
ABF for hospitals initially decreased the length of hospital stay in
the US and internationally, though it appeared to stabilize after
the initial decrease [42,57,99]. Although we did not review this
evidence systematically, prior non-systematic reviews have been
highly consistent in their findings and conclusions. Accepting this
finding as definitive, we did not include length of hospital stay as
one of our outcomes.
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Our results represent the best available evidence, and thus the
best guide for current decision-making regarding ABF. The results
demonstrate that strong claims of either benefits or harms of ABF
in the outcomes we studied are unwarranted. The appreciable
inconsistency of results across studies in most outcomes suggests
that there may be contexts in which ABF has substantial positive
or negative consequences. For example, it may be the case that
specific attributes of how ABF is implemented, such as with
activity limits, or policies of non-payment for readmissions, could
affect the outcomes we studied. We were not, however, able to
abstract and analyze data for contextual factors that clearly
explained differences in effect, and thus to determine the
circumstances in which ABF is likely to produce positive or
negative outcomes.
Reducing hospital length of stay is a worthwhile policy
objective. Unless there are clear and substantial negative
consequences to ABF, this alone might provide a rationale for its
implementation. Our review failed to identify compelling evidence
for such negative consequences, at least in terms of mortality or
hospital readmissions, although some studies raise the possibility of
detrimental effects on these outcomes under some circumstances.
Again, however, the evidence does not allow us to identify the
circumstances in which this is more likely to be the case.
ABF models have provided, in theory, a disincentive for
hospitals to re-admit patients quickly [8,100–102]. Our data,
however, provide low credibility evidence for a possible increase in
readmission early after the implementation of ABF. Results,
however, are highly variable and also consistent with no impact
whatsoever of ABF on readmission.
The evidence may be obscuring a true increase in readmissions.
For instance, patients may have been readmitted with a different
admission diagnosis to avoid financial penalties for excess
readmissions (even though this may attract charges of fraud)
[103–105]; others may have been held in hospital under ‘‘out-
patient observation status’’ but never technically readmitted
[106,107]. This interpretation speaks to the literature on the
opportunities for ‘‘gaming’’ under ABF systems [4,108], such as
the cataract unbundling we have described in the results [49]. It is
also possible that in response to earlier discharge, physicians
intensified their follow-up care, thereby preventing readmissions
[78]. The increased rate of discharge to post-acute care suggests
that more intensive or more frequent use of post-hospital care may
indeed have prevented an increase in readmission to acute care
hospitals.
Our robust finding that, at least in the US, ABF is associated
with increased discharge from hospital to PAC settings including
rehabilitation facilities, home health agencies, and other forms of
intermediate non-hospital health care suggests that introducing
ABF may come at a price for patients recently discharged from
acute care hospitals, but still needing care outside the hospital
sector before returning home. The finding is not unanticipated: a
funding model designed to reduce length of hospital stay provides
a powerful incentive to discharge patients not yet medically stable
enough to leave the health care system entirely.
Earlier discharge from hospital to PAC is not necessarily
undesirable: assuming there is sufficient post-acute care capacity to
meet demand it may be preferable for patients to enter a PAC
facility, or to return home earlier with professional home care,
rather than spend extra time in hospital. The danger, however, is
that if health care systems are not equipped to deal with the
additional burden of a potential 24% increase in patients requiring
some form of post-acute care following their earlier discharge, then
patients and their family caregivers at home will suffer [109]. Such
a large increase in PAC admissions might also offset potential
savings from any improved efficiency in acute care settings.
Further evidence supporting the increase in PAC discharges in
the US following introduction of ABF includes the associated
proliferation of cost-based post-acute facilities and programs that
were initially exempt from ABF [110]. Between 1988 and 1997,
expenditures on PAC increased at an average annual rate of 25
percent [111]. The increase in patients discharged to PAC, even in
the US, may have been a temporary phenomenon. In 1997, the
passage of legislation dramatically altered Medicare’s PAC
payment policies, shifting payment to PAC providers from a
cost-basis to prospective payment. This change decreased the
financial incentive for PAC facilities to admit from hospital those
patients needing a relatively high intensity of care [112]. In an
effort to ensure that care is provided in the most appropriate
setting with shared resources, some health care systems are now
considering other forms of bundled payment, beyond ABF of
hospital-specific care, to cover the entire scope of services, across
settings and providers —before, during, and after hospitalization
— for a particular episode of care [113–115].
The evidence suggests that the rate of discharge to PAC may be
a phenomenon restricted to the US. The credibility of this sub-
group finding is, however, only moderate: although one of a
relatively small number of a priori hypotheses and unlikely to be
explained by chance (interaction p-value 0.04), the finding is based
on only three studies outside of the US and is not consistent (one
study conducted in Stockholm, Sweden showed a small but statis-
tically significant increase in discharge to PAC with ABF [84]).
In countries like the US, where a post-acute care sector was
highly developed as a policy response to the implementation of
ABF in hospitals in 1983, the patient route to PAC was well-
travelled. But in countries in which ABF is a more recent
innovation, such as Sweden [84], Italy [74], and Germany [56],
the apparent absence of increased PAC discharges suggests that
underlying system and cultural differences may influence the
impact of ABF. It may be, for instance, that having witnessed the
substantial PAC sector that developed to accommodate the
transformative effect of ABF in the US, European social service
support systems developed primarily outside the institutional
health care sector, meeting the post-acute care needs of patients at
home, through community caregivers, or by families’ shouldering
the care burden. It may also be that patients in some countries are
moved to PAC settings within the same hospital, thereby not being
counted as discharged to PAC. Funding design outside the US
may also have incorporated volume capping or volume growth
moderation strategies (e.g. tapering payment for additional
volume) which would have reduced the benefit to hospitals of
earlier discharge to PAC – but also would make it less likely to
shorten hospital stay [9].
Perhaps the most optimistic interpretation of the sub-group
difference between international and US studies in PAC settings
would be one of policy learning. Europe implemented ABF 20
years or more after the US. The US studies report data mostly
from the 1980s, and their relevance may be somewhat limited
given the refinements in ABF over time, such as the addition to the
DRG classification system of a severity measure that may have, for
example, increased the European LOS sufficiently that patients
require less PAC. Alternatively, perhaps we have yet to see the full
effect of ABF on Europe’s health care systems, especially in the
PAC sector. Published evidence about the development of
Europe’s PAC sector in the post-ABF era is scant [4]. That we
have only three international studies in our review further limits
the strength of any inferences about how ABF impacts discharges
to PAC outside the US.
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health systems now implementing ABF increase their capacity in
the PAC setting to accommodate anticipated PAC discharges? Or
can they anticipate that, as we found in the three international
studies, discharges to PAC may not increase? In jurisdictions with
limited informal networks of care providers or where community-
based services are generally less well-developed, the risk of
increased need for PAC facilities may be particularly high. If
funding changes give rise to new demands for PAC, and if social
protection systems are slow to adapt, hardship will follow. In
countries in which hospital funding is almost exclusively provided
by governments, but in which funding and delivery of post-acute
care is a mixed public-private enterprise with families frequently
paying out-of-pocket for long term care or home care services, any
shift of care out of hospital and into the community sector has the
potential to threaten equitable access to care.
The shortened LOS that appears to be associated with ABF
should, in theory, pave the way for increasing volume of care,
particularly number of admissions. Improving access to care by
reducing waiting times is one potential policy objective of ABF and
faster patient turnover could enable this. We found, however, no
difference in volume of care, particularly number of acute
admissions, with ABF, though the results were highly variable.
One concern, expressed by critics of ABF, is the potential to
threaten equity of access by creating ‘‘profitable’’ and ‘‘unprofit-
able’’ diagnoses, or procedures, or programs — and thus patients
— with resulting avoidance of unprofitable services [95,116,117].
For instance, one study found that following ABF implementation
in South Carolina, the provision of TURP surgery declined by
25% for the ‘‘old-old’’ who tended to require longer hospital stays
and have more complications, but increased 100% for the ‘‘young-
old’’ [49]. To the extent that sicker patients are liable to be less
profitable, our analysis does not support this concern: we did not
find a decrease in severity of illness across populations admitted to
hospital before and after ABF. Rather, we found an overall
apparent increase, albeit highly variable, in the severity of illness.
This finding may be explained by differences in coding. Since
ABF models tend to adjust hospital compensation for acuity, there
is a financial incentive to code patients so they appear as sick as
possible, thus maximizing reimbursement. Upcoding may be
appropriate (if it represents legitimately better coding), question-
able, or inappropriate. In Germany, for example, the introduction
of ABF led to a very large increase in low birth weight babies and a
decrease in normal birth weight babies over a 5-year period, with
no biological or epidemiological explanation for this effect [118].
In the US, one study showed a decrease in overall case-fatality rate
with ABF, coupled with a large increase in volume of septicaemia
diagnoses, a combination highly suggestive of inappropriate
upcoding [54]. To the extent that inappropriate upcoding occurs,
it is likely to undermine at least one ABF policy objective:
controlling costs to payer.
Conclusions
Inferences regarding the impact of ABF are limited both by
inevitable study design constraints (randomized trails of ABF are
unlikely to be feasible) and by avoidable weaknesses in method-
ology of many studies. Further, the variation in results across
studies suggests that the impact of ABF may vary across settings,
though the evidence does not provide strong clues of the
determinants of differential effects. The ABF story thus provides
testimony to how modifications in health policy without adequate
evaluation leave their impact open to great uncertainty.
The most compelling evidence of any impact on ABF is on an
initial, but likely not sustained, decrease in hospital length of stay
following introduction of ABF, a possible increase in readmissions,
and an increase in discharges to post-acute care. The latter impact
may be restricted to the introduction of ABF in the US. Other
effects are likely absent, or restricted to specific settings, and
possibly manifest in different directions depending on the setting.
Thus, the evidence on the variables we studied does not support
either strong advocacy for, or strong rejection of, a change to ABF
from other hospital funding methods.
Those considering adoption of ABF should be aware of the
probable increase in admissions to post-acute care and other
possible unintended adverse consequences that may arise. A
paucity of consistent and conclusive evidence on the outcomes we
studied, however, does not allow a jurisdiction to predict if ABF
would be harmless. To this extent, despite the long and extensive
experience, changing to an ABF system represents a leap of faith.
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